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SYMPOSIUM: 50 YEARS WITH THE 25TH AMENDMENT
CELEBRATING THE PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
PROVISIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
By Joel. K. Goldstein*
Hearty congratulations to the Center for Constitutional Law and to
the Ray C. Bliss Center for Applied Politics for convening this symposium
on “Fifty Years with the Twenty-fifth Amendment: When a President is
Unable to Discharge the Duties of Office.” The topic is timely due to the
confluence of two, quite different events. Less than two years ago, the
Twenty-fifth Amendment experienced its 50th anniversary as part of our
Constitution. Golden jubilees furnish occasions to look back and forward
and are certainly worth extending for a year or two, especially regarding
an Amendment that addressed continuity of presidential leadership in an
effective manner, thereby better protecting the functioning of one branch
of our national government. Independent of the celebration, the
presidential inability features of the Amendment have received an
unprecedented amount of attention during the past two years as a range of
government officials, academics, and pundits have considered whether
they should be applied to President Donald J. Trump. 1
Not surprisingly, the latter issue, whether the 45th President is
“unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,” the standard the
Amendment sets, has largely diverted most observers from a
comprehensive study of the Amendment, an activity the 50th anniversary
would have suggested. The natural tendency to focus on the immediate
over the distant, the here-and-now over the past and future, the specific
over the general, helps explain the relative prominence of the Trump-and-

* Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Professors
Tracy A. Thomas and David B. Cohen for the invitation to participate in the symposium and their
hospitality, and to the other participants for stimulating papers and discussions.
1. See Joel K. Goldstein, Talking Trump and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Correcting the
Record on Section 4, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 74, 79-87 (2018) (summarizing discussion of whether
Section 4 applies to President Trump’s condition).
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the-Twenty-fifth Amendment question over the more inclusive, but
remote, Golden Jubilee project.
Obsession with current events often imposes costs, and it has in this
instance. The rush to discuss whether President Trump is “unable” to
discharge presidential powers has often obscured the context to which the
Amendment responded, and distracted attention from the seminal
contribution it made. The Trump focus has led many to form their initial
perceptions of the Amendment based simply on their conclusion
regarding whether, and how, it addresses the one specific scenario
Trump’s presidency presents without considering its larger scope and
operation.
This essay provides a broader perspective to the discussion of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment. Consistent with this symposium’s focus on the
presidential inability provisions of the Amendment, it addresses Section
3 and especially Section 4, rather than the presidential succession and
vice-presidential vacancy features of the Amendment, although as will be
seen, the latter provisions relate to the former. 2 This essay argues that the
presidential inability provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment
constituted a major contribution to ensuring presidential continuity.
Sections 3 and 4 responded to important constitutional questions that
made government officials unwilling to recognize presidential inabilities
that arose. They did so by providing clear, workable, and reasonable
procedures to allow government officials to deal with a range of different
scenarios involving presidential incapacity, not simply the one some
believe the Trump presidency presents. In doing so, they represented an
impressive legislative achievement which overcame formidable historical
and constitutional obstacles.

I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
To understand the historical context surrounding the Amendment,
America’s beginning is the place to start. The Constitution, as proposed
on September 17, 1787 by the Philadelphia Convention and ratified during
the next few years by the 13 states, provided that in case of the death,
resignation, removal, or “inability [of the President] to discharge the
powers and duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice
President.” 3 It also said that Congress could provide for the situation if
some combination of those four contingencies struck both the President
2.
3.

See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
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and Vice President, “declaring what Officer shall then act as President”
until the “[d]isability be removed, or a President shall be elected.” 4 At the
Constitutional Convention, delegate John Dickinson thought the clause
was “too vague” and wondered, “What is the extent of the
term ’disability’ & who is to be the judge of it?” 5 James Madison’s notes
did not record further discussion of those subjects, if any occurred, and
Dickinson’s two questions went unanswered.
The two gaps Dickinson identified –What’s disability? and Who’s
the Judge? —were important questions, yet the creators of our
Constitution understood that establishing a new constitutional republic
was a bold undertaking which would fail if a quest for perfection diverted
them from pursuing something very good. The framers recognized the
need to accept some uncertainty and imperfection, and they left some
issues to posterity in the faith that future generations would find
resolutions. Dickinson’s two questions were among those postponed.
The lack of a constitutional definition for inability presented little
practical problem during the first 180 years or so. The situations of
presidential incapacity, which made an impression, were relatively clear.
Yet the insight reflected in Dickinson’s “Who’s the Judge?” question
anticipated a significant complication. The Constitution did not state who
was to determine presidential inability or by what procedure. The lack of
a designated decision-maker with clear authority to determine presidential
inability impeded action. The constitutional silence implied that the Vice
President was charged with determining whether the President was
disabled since he assumed presidential responsibilities in that case. 6 Yet
his authority was unspecified, and Vice Presidents had reason not to act
in order to avoid the appearance of self-promotion. Moreover, for most of
American history Vice Presidents were not close presidential associates.7
They were chosen by party leaders, not presidential candidates, and often
had no personal relationship with the President or sense of loyalty to him. 8
Their selection often reflected a ticket-balancing strategy, and
accordingly, they frequently came from a rival wing of the party or even

4. Id.
5. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 427 (Max Farrand, ed. 1966).
6. RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 100-02, 110 (1951) (concluding that the
Constitution vests decision-making power in the successor).
7. JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE WHITE HOUSE VICE PRESIDENCY: THE PATH TO SIGNIFICANCE,
MONDALE TO BIDEN 18-19 (2016).
8. JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 47 (1982); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 18, 22.
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from a different party. They functioned in the legislative, not executive,
branch. 9
American history further complicated handling presidential inability
by introducing a third question regarding presidential inability. Recall that
the original Presidential Succession Clause provided that in case of the
death, resignation, removal, or “inability [of the President] to discharge
the powers and duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the
Vice President.” But what devolved on the Vice President, the “Office”
of the President, or simply “the powers and duties of the said Office?” In
the former case, the Vice President became President; in the latter, he
remained as Vice President but discharged presidential powers and duties.
When William Henry Harrison became the first President to die in
office on April 4, 1841, his Vice President, John Tyler, claimed that he
became President rather than simply discharging the powers and duties of
the presidency from the second office. Although some others disagreed,
Tyler enforced his interpretation by insisting on it. 10 When other
Presidents died in office, the Tyler Precedent was followed even though
Tyler’s interpretation was probably wrong. 11 It made little difference in
terms of the operation of government whether the Vice President became
President or simply exercised the powers and duties of the office when a
President died, resigned, or was removed, but his status introduced an
additional complication regarding presidential inability, one in many
respects more serious than those Dickinson identified. The Constitution
may have been unclear whether what devolved on the Vice President was
“the office” of the presidency or simply “the powers and duties of the
office,” but the text provided that “the same [thing]” devolved in each of
the four situations. 12 So if the Tyler Precedent correctly captured the
meaning of the clause when a President died, as history (wrongly) ruled
that it did, then the office, not simply its powers and duties, also passed
when a President was disabled.
Yet that constitutional interpretation introduced a big complication.
If the Vice President became President, the prior Chief Executive was

9. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 15, 19, 21-22.
10. See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
94-96 (1965) (discussing opposition to Tyler’s position that he had become President).
11. See Joel K. Goldstein, History and Constitutional Interpretation: Some Lessons From the
Vice Presidency, 69 ARK. L. REV. 647, 673 (2016) (concluding that the Tyler Precedent was
inconsistent with framers’ intent).
12. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of
his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same
shall devolve on the Vice President. . .”).
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ousted from office. After all, the Constitution envisions one President.13
Presidents and their associates would often be reluctant to acknowledge a
presidential inability if so doing meant that the presidency, not simply its
powers and duties, would then pass to the Vice President. If the President
was under a general anesthesia, national security might require, especially
in a nuclear age, transferring power, so there would be a functioning
Commander-in-Chief while the President was indisposed. But should the
President forever lose the office to which he was elected to undergo a
routine colonoscopy? Should that be the consequence of transferring
power while she recovered from a serious wound, injury, or illness? A
transfer might be acceptable when the perpetual nature of a presidential
inability was readily apparent, say, if the President was in a vegetative
state kept alive by technology, but not when the period of incapacity was
likely to be temporary, as often would be the case or at least the reasonable
expectation or hope. The logical extension of the Tyler Precedent, based
on a textual reading of the Constitution, suggested a permanent transfer
of the presidency upon a presidential inability, a reading that ensured that
presidential incapacities would not be recognized, or the occasion for
shifting power.
These two problems (Who’s the Judge? and Fear of the Permanent
Goodbye) combined to prevent action when Presidents suffered
significant inabilities. After James Garfield was shot in 1881, he
performed almost no presidential functions for 80 days before dying. 14
The Cabinet agreed that he was disabled but was divided over whether to
ask Vice President Chester A. Arthur to act as President for fear that the
Tyler Precedent might oust Garfield. 15 Similarly, following a serious
stroke, Woodrow Wilson clung to the presidency for the last 17 months
of his term even though he was clearly disabled for at least several months,
probably more. 16 There is some evidence that the lack of a designated
decision-maker and concern regarding the Tyler Precedent contributed to
the problem. 17 The three disabilities of President Dwight D. Eisenhower
in 1955-1957 presented the first occasions of presidential inability during

13. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a President of
the United States.”) (emphasis added).
14. FEERICK, supra note 10, at 123-28 (describing Garfield’s inactivity during the 80 days
between the shooting and his death).
15. SILVA, supra note 6, at 55-56; FEERICK, supra note 10, at 135-38.
16. See Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-presidential Behavior in a Disability Crisis: The Case of
Thomas R. Marshall, 33 POL. & LIFE SCI. 37, 37, 45 (Fall 2014).
17. SILVA, supra note 6, at 62-63, 65-67.
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the atomic age and Cold War, circumstances which attached urgency to
the issue. 18
Although committees in both houses of Congress investigated the
issue on several occasions from 1956 to 1963, neither chamber came close
to reaching a solution. 19 There was agreement that a problem existed, but
not how to solve it. 20 Absent legislative progress, the executive branch,
under President Eisenhower’s leadership, devised an informal interim
approach to the problem. In essence, Eisenhower and Vice President
Richard M. Nixon agreed that if Eisenhower determined he was unable to
discharge presidential powers and duties, he would so state and that Nixon
would act in his stead. They also agreed that if Eisenhower was unable to
declare his own disability, Nixon, after consultation that seemed
appropriate to him, could determine Eisenhower was disabled and then
act as President. In either case they agreed that Nixon would simply
discharge presidential powers and duties temporarily, not assume the
presidency, and that in either case, Eisenhower would determine when the
disability had ended. 21 The Eisenhower-Nixon agreement was made
public and later adopted by John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson and,
after Kennedy’s assassination, by Johnson and first Speaker of the House
John McCormick and then Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey. 22
Attorneys General Herbert Brownell and William Rogers under
Eisenhower, and Robert F. Kennedy under John Kennedy concluded the
arrangements were constitutional. 23
These agreements were a responsible and important effort to plug
constitutional gaps absent congressional action, but they had
shortcomings as a permanent solution. Although repetition could have
fortified their legitimacy, they lacked the certainty of a constitutional
amendment and could be challenged if relied upon by a President or Vice
President. Their continued use depended on constitutional norms, not text,
so a future President could abandon them. They allowed the Vice
President, and especially the President, to make certain determinations
unilaterally, which presented some risks. If, for instance, a mentally

18. Joel K. Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment: Republican Contributions to the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2017) [hereinafter Goldstein, The
Bipartisan Bayh Amendment].
19. FEERICK, supra note 10, at 238-44 (discussing legislative activity from 1956 to 1963).
20. Id. at 242.
21. Agreement Between the President and Vice President as to Procedures in the Event of
Presidential Disability, 1 PUB. PAPERS 196 (MAR. 3, 1958).
22. Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment, supra note 18, at 1143.
23. Presidential Inability, 42 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 69, 70, 92-95 (1961).
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unbalanced President reclaimed his powers and duties, the letter
agreements provided no basis to challenge his or her action. 24
A fourth constitutional issue also presented itself; specifically, how
could lawmakers address the problems Dickinson’s questions identified
and Tyler’s Precedent created. Although some believed Congress could
enact a statute regarding the problems, 25 others thought the Constitution
denied it that power. 26 The second part of the Presidential Succession
Clause empowered Congress to legislate to address a double vacancy in
the presidency and vice presidency, and some thought this grant implicitly
denied Congress that power regarding a single vacancy. The uncertainty
regarding whether legislation would be sufficient argued in favor of a
constitutional amendment. 27 Moreover, a constitutional amendment
clearly was needed to make some other changes reformers sought, like
providing a means to fill an intra-term vice-presidential vacancy.
The need to use a constitutional amendment made the reformer’s task
much more difficult. Instead of the simple majorities in the House of
Representatives and Senate and presidential approval needed for ordinary
legislation, 28 constitutional amendment, of course, imposes a triple supermajority vote requirement—a two-thirds vote in the House of
Representatives, a two-thirds vote in the Senate, and ratification by threefourths of the states. 29 That onerous burden minimized the prospects for
success. The Constitution has been amended only 27 times over 230 years,
and even the ratio of one amendment every 8.5 years greatly overstates
their frequency since the first 12 amendments came in the first 15 years,
three came following the Civil War, and four came during the progressive
period between 1913 and 1920.

24. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 7-8 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 7-8 (1965).
25. 111 CONG. REC. 3253-54, 3257 (1965) (statement of Sen. Allen Ellender); id. at 7944
(statement of Rep. Basil Whitener); id. at 7945-46 (statement of Rep. Edward Hutchinson); id. at
15,585 (statement of Sen. Eugene McCarthy).
26. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 8-9 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 8-9 (1965); S. REP. NO. 88-1382,
at 7-8 (1964).
27. Joel K. Goldstein, Taking From the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring
Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 999 (2010) [hereinafter Goldstein, Taking from
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment].; S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 9 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 9 (1965).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it. . .”).
29. See U.S. CONST, art. V.
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II. POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS, CONTEXT AND LEADERSHIP
These high requirements for a constitutional amendment alone did
not make that endeavor a project for the casual legislator, yet political
obstacles specific to presidential succession and inability made the
challenge even more daunting. To begin with, presidential succession and
inability was not an issue which promised political reward. Time invested
on the issue was unlikely to pay an electoral dividend. It also was a
somewhat delicate undertaking, especially in 1963-1964, because of the
perception that the interest in providing a means to fill a vice-presidential
vacancy was an implicit rebuke to Speaker of the House of
Representatives John McCormick, who was first in line of succession
while the second office was unfilled. 30 The House might reject a proposal,
and a Senate advocate might alienate colleagues in the other body, whose
cooperation might be needed on other matters. The rarity of constitutional
amendments and their serious and permanent nature probably made
legislators less disposed to accept proposals about which they had any
doubts. Moreover, the multiplicity of proposals and lack of consensus had
long prevented action regarding presidential succession and inability. 31
Notwithstanding these obstacles, Congress proposed the Twentyfifth Amendment in July 1965, and by February 1967, only 19 months
later, the requisite 38 states had ratified it to make it part of the
Constitution. Ultimately 47 states ratified the Amendment. 32 That event
represented a remarkable accomplishment.
In one sense, the Amendment was the culmination of work that
occurred in Congress and the executive branch over a decade.33
Committees in the House and Senate studied the problem extensively
during the 1950s and 1960s, as did President Eisenhower and his
department of justice, led by Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers, and
to a lesser extent Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and Attorneys General
Kennedy and Nicholas Katzenbach. 34 The American Bar Association
committed extensive resources to studying the problem and worked

30. Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment, supra note 18, at 1148-49.
31. See Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearings on S.J.
Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 150 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Senate Hearings] (statement of John D. Feerick).
32. JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS 104, 105-07 (3rd. ed. 2014) [hereinafter FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT]
33. See Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment, supra note 18, at 1141-43 (describing
developments during the 1950s).
34. FEERICK, supra note 10, at 238-44; Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment, supra note
18, at 1141-44.
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towards the passage of the Amendment. 35 Scholars contributed
constructively, especially John D. Feerick who provided the leading
scholarly studies of the subject. Feerick’s articles considering ratification
were disseminated to members of Congress and state legislators. In
addition, he advised key legislators like Senator Birch Bayh and
Representative Richard Poff, as well as ABA officials, and helped direct
crucial activities of the ABA to promote ratification.36
Events also propelled the effort. 37 The Eisenhower inabilities during
the 1950s and the Kennedy assassination on November 22, 1963 raised
the visibility and perceived importance of presidential continuity,
especially since they occurred during the atomic age. Although the
Kennedy assassination primarily focused attention on the problems of
presidential succession and vice-presidential vacancy, it also brought
presidential inability issues to the forefront. It was, after all, very
reasonable to imagine a scenario in which the President was permanently
disabled rather than killed, and many participants in the discussion raised
that hypothetical. 38
The Amendment also advanced due to the skillful and persistent
efforts of Senator Birch Bayh. As the new chair of the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, he embraced the issue.
Bayh was committed to improving on the status quo, and he dedicated
himself to the issue. 39
Though one of the most junior members of Congress, having been
first elected in November 1962 at age 34, Bayh did a masterful job of
steering the measure through the Senate. Bayh’s decision to incorporate
provisions from the Eisenhower-Brownell proposal of the mid-1950s
helped secure support and make it a bipartisan effort. 40 He adopted an
inclusive approach to colleagues, which helped win important backing
from Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Senators Sam Ervin and key
35. See John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: A Personal Remembrance, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1079-85, 1086-1104 (2017) [hereinafter Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth
Amendment: A Personal Remembrance]; FEERICK, supra note 10, at 244-54; Goldstein, Taking from
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 27, at 1009.
36. See generally Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: A Personal Remembrance, supra
note 35 (describing Feerick’s activities).
37. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 27, at 1000 (describing
historical events that lent urgency to issue).
38. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 97 & n.123 (citing some references to specter of Kennedy
disability).
39. See Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 27, at 1006-07; BIRCH
BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION (1968) (describing
Bayh’s legislative efforts).
40. See Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment, supra note 18, at 1146, 1149-54.
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Republicans like Everett Dirksen, Roman Hruska, and Jacob Javits. In the
House of Representatives, he worked closely with judiciary committee
chair Emanuel Celler and also with Republicans William McCulloch and
Richard Poff, both of whom played important roles in securing passage of
the measure. 41
Congress addressed the issue with a problem-solving spirit in which
members were willing to subordinate their preferences to achieve
consensus. In testifying before the Senate, on February 28, 1964, Feerick
had eloquently argued that the lack of such an attitude had prevented a
solution and that such an approach would be crucial. He said:
Perhaps one of the main reasons for the continued failure to solve this
problem has been the great diversity of proposals. All have some merit.
None is completely without objection. Each proposal has its adherents.
No proposal has ever commanded enough support to be adopted. I am
convinced that this problem can be solved. However, I am equally
convinced that the problem will never be solved if the trend persists
whereby each of us stubbornly adheres to his own point of view. If this
problem is ever to be solved men must agree and if they are to agree,
they must actively work at it. The time has come for those who are
genuinely interested in the safety of this Nation to stop emphasizing
those points on which they differ and to start emphasizing those points
on which they agree. It is urgent that the problem be solved now. To
miss this opportunity and again leave unsolved one of the most serious
problems ever to confront the Congress would be to trifle with the
security of this great Nation. Therefore, we must make every human
effort to agree on a workable solution. 42

Bayh embraced the attitude Feerick recommended, as did others, and the
spread of this disposition encouraged accommodation.
Although Representative Emanuel Celler had been working on the
problem since the mid-1950s, long before Bayh entered Congress, he put
aside any feelings of ownership that his seniority and prior efforts might
have aroused to introduce in the House the measure Bayh championed in
the Senate. Bayh and Celler recognized that only a bipartisan effort would
attract the super-majority support needed at multiple stages. Bayh enlisted
the help of former President Eisenhower, former Vice President Richard
M. Nixon, and former Attorney General Brownell, and worked closely
with Republican senators like minority leader Dirksen, Hiram Fong and
Roman Hruska. 43 Celler collaborated closely with McCulloch and Poff,
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1159-68 (describing contributions of Republican legislators).
1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 31, at 150.
Goldstein, The Bipartisan Bayh Amendment, supra note 18, at 1146-61,
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both of whom made significant contributions. 44 In addition to the
bipartisan efforts, Bayh worked hard to involve prominent endorsers
whose support would influence others—President Johnson, Eisenhower,
Nixon, Brownell, and Katzenbach, and esteemed Senate colleagues like
Mansfield, Dirksen, Sam Ervin, Jacob Javits, Philip Hart, and others.
Legislators demonstrated a willingness to compromise in order to achieve
agreement. 45 Although accommodations were evident on a range of
issues, the most crucial instance occurred at the end, which was regarding
some of the time periods included in Section 4 in which the Senate’s
resistance to time limits on debate and the House’s insistence on some
required mutual adjustments. 46
III. THE CONTENT OF THE AMENDMENT
A.

Responding to the Problems History Presented

The Amendment addressed the Dickinson-Tyler problems which had
prevented transfers of presidential power during prior presidential
inability situations. Section 1 confirmed that the Tyler precedent applied
to the three contingencies which necessarily prevented a President from
discharging presidential powers and duties on a permanent basis but not
to presidential inability. 47 It made clear, that when a President died,
resigned, or was removed from office (but not when he was simply unable
to discharge the duties), the Vice President became President. In giving
textual recognition to the Tyler Precedent in the three non-presidential
inability contingencies, Section 1 had two important consequences. By
separating presidential inability from the other contingencies, it suggested
that no presidential succession occurred upon presidential inability, a
point Sections 3 and 4 made explicit. Section 1 also confirmed that since
the Vice President became President following a presidential death,
resignation, or removal, a vice-presidential vacancy developed in those
three situations, thereby triggering Section 2, which provided a means to
provide a new Vice President before the pending presidential term ended.
Since no vice-presidential vacancy occurred under Sections 3 and 4,
presidential inability presented no occasion to use Section 2.

44. Id. at 1156, 1162-66.
45. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 27, at 1005-06
46. See BAYH, supra note 39, at 282-304; FEERICK THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra
note 32, at 100-01.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 (“In case of the removal of the President from office or of
his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.”).
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Unlike most of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, Section 2’s primary
focus is not on presidential inability. 48 Its creation reflected the conclusion
that the vice presidency provided the best means to fill a presidential
vacancy. 49 By creating a new mechanism to fill the vice presidency,
Section 2 greatly reduced the likelihood that anyone other than a Vice
President would succeed to the presidency. 50 Prior to the ratification of
the Twenty-fifth Amendment, the vice presidency had been vacant, and
someone other than the Vice President had been first in line, on 16
occasions during 16 of the 44 presidential terms (36% of the presidential
terms) for 37 years and 3 months (or 20% of the American presidency). 51
Since then, the second office has been vacant only 6 months, or less than
1% of the time. 52 Section 2 is not alone in being responsible for this
improvement, but it reduced the vice-presidential vacancy period
substantially. For instance, during the Nixon-Ford term Section 2 shrank
that time from 39 months (the time remaining in the term after Vice
President Spiro T. Agnew’s resignation on October 10, 1973) to only six
months (the time the office was vacant between Agnew’s resignation and
Gerald R. Ford’s installation and between Ford’s succession to the
presidency and Nelson A. Rockefeller’s installation as his Vice
President).
Yet Section 2 also made an invaluable contribution to handling
presidential inability. The presidential inability provisions of the Twentyfifth Amendment depend on a functioning Vice President. The Vice
President is the only transferee of presidential powers and duties during a
presidential inability under Section 3 and 4 of the Amendment. They
specify the Vice President and accordingly do not govern a transfer to any
other officer. Under Section 4, the Vice President is also the crucial
decision-maker. Section 2 facilitates those presidential inability
provisions by creating a means to reduce substantially the time the second
office is unfilled and accordingly increase the time that they are
operational.

48. U.S. CONST. amend XXV, 2 (“Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by
a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.”).
49. See Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 27, at 969, 986-87.
50. Id. at 1018.
51. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 229
52. Id.
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Sections 3 53and 4 54 responded directly to the problems posed by
Dickinson’s “Who the Judge?” question and by the Tyler Precedent.
Regarding the former, they identified decision-makers and procedures
which outlined who decided a presidential inability, how the decision was
communicated, who assumed presidential powers and duties during the
presidential inability, and how and when the President could resume those
powers and duties. Section 3 provided a relatively uncontroversial
procedure for situations in which a President voluntarily recognized a
future or existing inability. By transmitting the prescribed public
correspondence to independent officials in the legislative branch, the
President could transfer presidential power and then reclaim it. Section 4
addressed the more complicated situation where a disabled President
could not or would not, recognize his incapacity. In that situation, the Vice
President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive
departments or such other body as Congress might create, could declare
by a public transmission to legislative leaders that the President was
disabled, in which case the Vice President “immediately” assumed the
powers and duties of the presidency. The President could reclaim his
powers by a written declaration of his fitness to the same legislative
leaders “unless” the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet heads
“transmit within four days” a new declaration stating that the President is
unable. In such a situation, Congress must resolve the issue within roughly
three weeks with a two-thirds vote in each house necessary for the Vice
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3 (“Whenever the President transmits to the President pro
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
President.”).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4 (“Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the
powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers
of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within
four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if
not in session. If the Congress within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration,
or, if Congress is not in session within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble,
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President;
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.”).
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President to continue acting as President. Section 4 made clear that the
Vice President remained in power during the four day period he and others
had to consider a challenge to the President’s “no inability” assertion and,
if they issued one, within the time allowed Congress to resolve the
dispute. 55
Sections 3 and 4 also confirmed that the Tyler Precedent did not
apply to presidential inability. Rather, in case of a presidential inability,
the Vice President exercised presidential powers and duties, but did not
succeed to the presidency, and could discharge those responsibilities
temporarily. The President retained the presidency and could resume the
exercise of presidential powers and duties once the inability ended. 56 This
constitutional clarification prospectively remedied the confusion the Tyler
Precedent introduced.
Some have criticized the Twenty-fifth Amendment for not defining
“unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,” the relevant
criteria set forth in Sections 3 and 4. 57 Such criticisms are curious. Just as
the original Constitution did not define “inability” or “disability,” the
words the Presidential Succession Clause used, the Twenty-fifth
Amendment did not define “unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office.” 58 The absence of a constitutional definition was deliberate.59
Historically, that lack of definition had not prevented action because the
existence of presidential inabilities had been clear. The creators of the
Twenty-fifth Amendment concluded that it would be a mistake to provide
a constitutional definition of the term which might inadvertently exclude
55. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 125-49.
56. See Id. at 121-24.
57. See, e.g.,Julia Azari, What Does Invoking The 25th Amendment Actually Look Like?
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 19, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-does-invoking-the25th-amendment-actually-look-like/ [https://perma.cc/N589-JH65] (stating that Section 4 “has a
number of ambiguous phrases that leave it open to a range of possibilities” including regarding
meaning of “unable” to discharge presidential powers and duties);. Joshua Zeitz, Why the 25th
Amendment Doesn’t Apply to Trump—No Matter What He Tweets, POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/10/25th-amendment-trump-216267
[https://perma.cc/Z8NC-ESW7] (stating that the Amendment is “ambiguous” including on when
President is disabled); David Pozen, The Deceptively Clear Twenty-fifth Amendment, CONST. CTR.
(Jul. 11, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendmentxxv/the-deceptively-clear-twenty-fifth-amendment-by-david-pozen/interp/42
[https://perma.cc/W79R-R6TU] (complaining that the terms “unable” and “inability” are not defined
in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment or elsewhere in the Constitution).
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, sec.§ 1, cl. 6.
59. 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (stating that drafters of
Section 4 considered definitional issues and determined it would be “unwise” to provide definition in
Constitution); FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 32, at 112 (stating that lack of
a constitutional definition was not an “oversight”); Goldstein, supra note 1, at 105-06 (discussing
decision not to define terms and considerations underlying it).
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some situation later decision-makers might think merited a transfer. 60
Rather than being prescriptive for the future, they thought it prudent to
trust in the ability of future decision-makers to act conscientiously within
the broad parameters of the constitutional language.
Moreover, the criticisms are mistaken. The Amendment did not
ignore Dickinson’s request for greater clarity regarding the meaning of
the term (or its synonyms). The authoritative legislative materials
associated with the Twenty-fifth Amendment provided very extensive
guidance, leaving little doubt regarding many of the sorts of conditions to
which Sections 3 and 4 applied. The clauses include a wide range of
physical and mental inabilities. 61 These situations could be produced by
trauma, attack, injury, illness, surgery (whether elective or not), or
emotional factors or could result from a degenerative process. 62 These
included situations in which the President was conscious, as well as
unconscious, and where he was unwilling to acknowledge a disability, as
well as when he was unable to do so. 63 They could be permanent or
transient. They included disabilities created by logistical problems, such
as a missing Air Force One or a kidnapped chief executive or one lacking
communication with government. 64 As John Feerick explained, the terms
in Sections 3 and 4 “are intended to cover all cases in which some
condition or circumstance prevents the President from discharging his
powers and duties and the public business requires that the Vice President
discharge them.” 65 Sections 3 and 4 were not intended to provide a no-

60. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 32, at 112 (stating that framers
decided that a “rigid constitutional definition was undesirable”).
61. Id. at 112 (stating that the legislative record indicates that “unable” and “inability” applied
to “all cases in which some condition or circumstance prevents the President from discharging his
powers and duties and the public business requires that the Vice President discharge them”); id. at
112-117 (providing further discussion); Goldstein, supra note 1, at 99-103 (discussing Section 4’s
application to mental as well as physical inability with references to legislative record).
62. See generally FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 32, at 113, 115. See,
also Special Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters, 1 PUB. PAPERS
101-02 (Jan. 28, 1965) (referring to “incapacity by injury, illness, senility, or other affliction” as
targets of Amendment).
63. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 106-12.
64. See Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearing on S.J.
Res.1 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 20 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (referring to
inabilities as including foreign travel, communications breakdowns, capture of the President, or
“anything that is imaginable”).
65. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 32, at 112.
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confidence mechanism 66 or a means for a President to escape his or her
obligations. 67
The Twenty-fifth Amendment generally addressed the most
important gaps regarding presidential inability which history had revealed
as of the mid-1960s. It answered Dickinson’s “Who is the Judge” question
specifically by providing designated decision-makers and a process. It
responded to Dickinson’s definitional inquiry by providing a broad and
flexible term as well as a legislative history suggesting examples and
parameters. And it confined the Tyler Precedent to the three situations
where the prior President could not return and made it inapplicable to
presidential inability. In doing so, it eliminated the mischief the Tyler
Precedent had inadvertently introduced into inability determinations.
B.

A Sensible Approach to Presidential Disability Determinations

In addition to addressing the historical problems Dickinson identified
and Tyler magnified, the Amendment provided a sensible approach. No
one disagreed that the President should be able to declare his own
disability and accordingly transfer powers to the Vice President
temporarily. Allowing a President who transferred powers voluntarily to
resume the functions of the office unilaterally gave the President greater
incentive to recognize a disability and transfer presidential responsibilities
to the Vice President under Section 3. A President who was sufficiently
aware and concerned to acknowledge his or her own disability would be
more likely to be reliable enough to determine its end. Moreover, Section
4 still provided a check. Although a President who declared his inability
pursuant to Section 3 could reclaim powers and duties without challenge,
the Vice President and Cabinet could invoke Section 4 after the President
reclaimed powers if they thought he was “unable to discharge”
presidential powers and duties.
Section 4, which provided for others to declare the President disabled
and transfer power from him, aroused greater controversy. Some thought
the initial decision to transfer power from the President should be made
in the executive branch, either by the Vice President alone, or the Vice
President and the President’s Cabinet. Others thought the decision should
be made outside of the executive branch, either by Congress, a
commission consisting of government officials, or of medical personnel

66.
67.

Id. at 117; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 117.
FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 32, at 113.
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or of some combination of the two groups. 68 Two leading scholars of the
presidency, Clinton Rossiter and Richard Neustadt, thought the informal
letter agreements provided the best approach. 69 Another proposal which
was popular in some circles would have simply rebutted the Tyler
Precedent regarding presidential inability and empowered Congress to
legislate regarding presidential inability without addressing vicepresidential vacancy or providing procedures to handle presidential
inability. 70
Any approach would have advantages and disadvantages. The great
American philosopher, Yogi Berra, once captured the mistaken conceit of
many reformers when he said that the way to eliminate the close plays at
first base was to move first base back a foot. 71 Just as moving a base
simply relocates the close calls from one place to another without
producing any net gain, virtually any reform eliminates some problems
but accepts or creates others.
Entrusting the decision to the Vice President and a majority of the
Cabinet presented some clear advantages. The relationship between the
President and these officials encouraged confidence that the decisionmakers would be knowledgeable about the President’s condition and
about affairs of state and accordingly would be well-positioned to
determine whether a presidential inability declaration was advisable.
Executive branch officials would be less likely to act due to hostility to
the President or to usurp his power. These were natural concerns among
reformers since the President owed his or her position to the operation of
American constitutional processes. The relationship these decisionmakers had to the President would support the legitimacy of a transfer of
presidential powers and duties. A determination by the President’s
political family that he or she was disabled would carry weight with other
officials and the public. The executive branch officials would be able to
act quickly. Empowering executive branch officials to declare a President
disabled would make a President more willing to acknowledge his own
inability because doing so would not expose himself to later action by

68. See FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 32, at 51-63 (describing some
of the proposals and positions).
69. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 31, at 168-69 (testimony of Prof. Neustadt); id. at 21416, 219-20 (testimony of Prof. Rossiter).
70. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 32, at 54-55.
71. Quoted in HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 203 (1990).
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non-loyal decision-makers. And this arrangement would provide political
comfort to a Vice President who might otherwise be reticent to act.72
Of course, the loyalty of executive branch officials might make them
more reluctant than independent decision-makers to declare the disability
of the President. They might conceal a presidential inability. That risk
might be greatest when the particulars regarding the President’s condition
were not widely known.
On the other hand, a commission might use presidential inability to
harass a President for partisan reasons. A commission’s decision that the
President was disabled would lack the legitimacy of a decision by the
President’s executive branch associates. In clear cases of presidential
inability, a commission would be unnecessary and probably slower than
an executive branch approach. A congressional process, especially if the
President’s political adversaries controlled Congress, might present
similar problems to a disability commission as well as introduce a new
check in Congress’s favor that could alter the balance between the
legislative and executive branches.
The congressional enabling proposal also encountered serious
objections. Congress might legislate in a way that would intrude on
presidential prerogatives. More likely, Congress would take no action, and
the nation would remain without procedures to transfer power from a
disabled President. It seemed unfortunate to waste the momentum the
Kennedy assassination had provided to do nothing more than to rebut the
Tyler Precedent. And the states might have resisted ratifying an
Amendment which essentially gave Congress a blank check to legislate
on the topic rather than outlining some specific procedures. 73
In essence, both an executive branch and a commission approach had
advantages and disadvantages. Neither approach would handle all
imaginable circumstances equally well. Ultimately, the architects of
Section 4 decided that the judgment should be made in the executive
branch. They concluded that an executive branch arrangement would best
handle the situations most likely to arise, without the perils of a disability
commission.
But they hedged their bets by introducing some flexibility into the
arrangement. Section 4 authorized Congress to replace the “principal
72. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 89-203, at 13 (1965); S. Rep. No. 89-66, at 13 (1965). See also
Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The Power of Reciprocal
Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT 165,
191-95 (Robert E. Gilbert, ed. 2000) (discussing considerations favoring inclusion of Vice President
and Cabinet officers) [hereinafter Goldstein, The Vice Presidency].
73. See BAYH, supra note 39, at 55, 65, 67.
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officers of the executive branch” as the Vice President’s partners in the
decision with “such other body as Congress may by law provide.” The
ABA blue-ribbon committee had suggested this innovation at its January
1964 meeting, 74 Bayh added it to his revised proposal (S. J. Res. 139) that
spring 75 and the Senate Judiciary Committee approved it that summer. 76
Although the Vice President remained as a necessary participant in a
Section 4 decision, the Amendment gave Congress power to legislatively
modify the Vice President’s co-decision-maker to accommodate the
lessons from future experience.
The inclusion of the “such other body” feature had both
constitutional and political significance. Constitutionally, it avoided a
future problem the framers of the Amendment had faced, the uncertainty
regarding whether Congress could legislatively address presidential
inability. The “such other body” provision authorized Congress not only
to legislate, but to modify Section 4 by replacing the Cabinet with some
other body to act in addition to the Vice President. Politically, the addition
probably helped placate some who preferred an arrangement outside of
the executive branch by leaving open the possibility of reverting to a
partial non-executive decision-making body (or a different executive
branch decision-maker) to act in the future with the Vice President.
Section 4 provided a mechanism whereby a President could reclaim
presidential powers and duties when his incapacity ended but where other
authorized decision-makers could prevent that from occurring if they
disagreed with the President’s assessment of his condition. The framers
sought to balance the desire that the President resume the powers and
duties of his office if his inability had ended against the desirability of
ascertaining that the circumstances which had precipitated the disability
decision had been resolved. In essence, the Vice President and a majority
of his fellow decision-makers could preclude the President from resuming
power by contesting his declaration within four days, in which case
Congress would referee the dispute. The President would return to power
if either house failed to produce a two-thirds vote against his position
within 21 days. The framers believed that such intra-executive disputes
would rarely, if ever happen, and then only if the President was mentally
unbalanced. 77

74. See FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 32, at 57-58 (reprinting ABA
consensus statement including #4 with “such other body” innovation).
75. Id. at 71-75.
76. Id. at 75.
77. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 103.
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IV. POST-RATIFICATIONS ENHANCEMENTS OF THE INABILITY
PROVISIONS
Although the words of the Constitution, including its amendments,
are fixed (until changed), they operate in a dynamic context. Institutional
behavior and relationships, practices, and expectations change, and
constitutional provisions must be implemented in conditions that differ
from those in which they were created. In important respects, events
during the fifty-plus years since the ratification of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment have strengthened its presidential inability provisions.
In particular, the stunning development of the vice presidency during
the last five decades should increase the likelihood that presidential
inability will be recognized and addressed when it exists. The Amendment
was based upon the premise that the office had grown, that it provided the
optimal means of handling presidential succession and inability, and that
it should be filled at all times. 78 Though accurate, the framers exaggerated
the development of the vice presidency as of 1965. Yet beginning in 1977,
the office did become an integral part of the President’s inner circle, and
since then, the Vice President has functioned as not simply a member of
the executive branch, but as a close political and professional ally of the
President who routinely works with the President’s Cabinet and personal
staff. 79 This development should make Presidents more willing to transfer
power to their Vice President under Section 3 and should make other
administration officials more comfortable contemplating such a move
when presented with a presidential inability that exists but which the
President does not or cannot declare.
Some constructive practices have developed to facilitate the use of
the presidential inability provisions. Presidents have invoked Section 3 on
three occasions when they underwent medical procedures during the
Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush administrations and were prepared
to use it on at least four other occasions during the Jimmy Carter, George
H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama administrations. 80 These
actions and preparations have established an expectation that a President

78. Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 505,
526-40 (1995).
79. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 301-03.
80. Id. at 255-59 (discussing Section 3 transfers under Reagan and Bush and planning under
Carter, Bush, and Clinton); Second Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential
Succession, Report: Fifty Years After the Twenty-fifth Amendment: Recommendations for Improving
the Presidential Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 926-27 (2017) (discussing
consideration of using Section 3 before medical procedures of Presidents Carter, Bush, Clinton and
Obama).
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will transfer powers and duties to the Vice President in advance of a
planned medical procedure involving general anesthesia.
To be sure, the record is not perfect. The Reagan administration
failed to invoke Section 3 once, when it should have, when President
Reagan was shot on March 30, 1981 81 and botched the execution of
Section 3 in 1985. 82 The neglect during the assassination attempt might
be explained by the fact that the administration was new and unprepared
to deal with a presidential inability, and relations between principal
officials had not yet been developed. Moreover, Vice President Bush was
in Texas and communications between his plane and the White House
were problematic. 83 On the latter occasion, President Reagan initially
signed a letter suggesting that Section 3 was not the basis of his action and
questioned whether it applied and later resumed presidential powers and
duties prematurely. Regarding the former mistake, Reagan later said he
used Section 3, he followed its procedures precisely, and it furnished the
only basis to transfer powers to the Vice President and reclaim them.
Regarding the early resumption, one hopes future administrations learn
from this experience. Nonetheless, the use, and near-use, of Section 3 has
developed a practice of invoking it when the President has surgery under
general anesthesia. 84 History, both subsequent 85 and prior, 86 suggests
some other scenarios where Section 3 would be appropriate as has popular
culture. 87
Section 4 has not yet been used, yet some positive developments
have occurred. The White House Counsel’s office had not yet completed
preparing a volume regarding the Amendment to cover contingency

81. See, e.g., Nancy Kassop, “The Law”: When Law and Politics Collide: Presidents and the
Use of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 147, 155-57 (2005) (describing
events and decision-making following shooting of Reagan).
82. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 27, at 977-80.
83. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 253-54 (discussing impediments to transfer following
Reagan assassination attempt).
84. See FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 32, at 196-99.
85. Joel K. Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 67, 99102 (2010) (suggesting that Section 3 might be used by a President recovering from substance abuse,
bereavement, or preoccupied with impeachment proceedings) [hereinafter Goldstein, Akhil Reed
Amar and Presidential Continuity]
86. Id. at 99-100 (suggesting that Section 3 would apply to a President recuperating from
illness or injury or experiencing bereavement).
87. Id. at 100-01 (suggesting that President Jed Bartlett properly declared himself unable to
discharge presidential powers and duties in episode of The West Wing where terrorists kidnapped his
daughter and ought to negotiate with him, although absence of Vice President took this example out
of Section 3).
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planning at the time of the Reagan assassination attempt, 88 but it
subsequently did. 89 The Office of Legal Counsel issued some useful
memoranda regarding the operation of Sections 3 and 4. 90 President
George H.W. Bush held a meeting to discuss its use with his Vice
President, Dan Quayle, and other interested parties, in April 1989.91 The
contingency books have been transmitted from administration to
administration. Although they contain some imperfections, which I plan
to discuss in a future article, they represent a positive development.
Officials in the Trump Administration have apparently discussed Section
4 and whether it should be invoked. 92 Various outside groups have studied
the presidential inability provisions and have made some constructive
suggestions. 93
The process of implementing constitutional procedures often occurs
over protracted periods of time as officials learn from and react to their
own acts and omissions and those of their predecessors. There is no reason
to believe that such a process will not occur regarding presidential
inability.
Even as we expect such a process to occur, it is important to keep in
mind some inherent limitations of any arrangement to deal with the
transfer of presidential powers and duties during a period of presidential
inability. First, any such presidential inability is likely to subject decisionmakers, implementers, other government officials, and citizens to
situations that are unique and unusually stressful. The novelty and stress
would vary with the range of scenarios, extending from a routine planned
procedure to a shooting, acute serious illness, or deranged President.
Second, although Section 3 and 4 transfer presidential powers and duties
to the Vice President, government will not function normally under either
a Section 3 or 4 situation. The person exercising presidential powers and
duties will not be the President, he or she will have a different political
status and reputation and will be dealing with and relying on associates

88. Fred F. Fielding, Keynote Address: An Eyewitness Account of Executive “Inability,” 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 828 (2010)
89. Id.
90. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 252-53 (describing OLC memoranda).
91. Id. at 257-58 (describing Bush contingency planning); Kassop, supra note 81, at 154.
92. Devan Cole, McCabe confirms talks held at Justice Dept. about removing Trump, CNN
(Feb.
14,
2019)
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/14/politics/andrew-mccabe-obstruction-ofjustice/index.html [https://perma.cc/KAR6-XHYH].
93. See, e.g., YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: A READER’S GUIDE (2018); Second Fordham University School
of Law Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra note 80.
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who were commissioned by the incapacitated leader. 94 The circumstances
will further constrain the Vice President’s behavior as Acting President. 95
When the President invokes Section 3 before a routine procedure or any
situation in which she is expected to recover in a few days or weeks, the
transfer to the Vice President is largely designed to make sure that a
functional constitutionally authorized person is positioned to take
emergency action to defend the United States or its interests. Otherwise,
the Vice President in such a situation will do little that she could not
normally do. 96 Her primary role, in Clinton Rossiter’s memorable phrase,
is to “keep the shop.” 97 Where the President is temporarily unconscious
or conscious but not at his best, a Vice President, as Acting President, is
likely to defer any significant action that can be postponed for later
presidential decision so as to avoid the awkwardness of a later presidential
reversal or second-guessing. 98 A Vice President acting in a situation in
which the unconscious President is maintained by technological life
support which doctors agree he will never escape would occupy a quite
different situation in which his actual powers would approximate those
the Constitution confers. 99 There are a range of possibilities, but in most
the Vice President as Acting President would be likely to act in a far more
restrained manner than would the President.
The presidential inability provisions make an important contribution
to ensuring presidential continuity. They should be invoked when a
President is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of” the presidency.
In many situations, however, the Vice President as Acting President is
likely to do very little different than what he or she would have done
simply as Vice President.
V. GAPS IN, AND CRITICISMS OF, PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY PROVISIONS
It is worth saying a bit in response to some recent criticisms of the
presidential inability provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment. Much
of the negative comment is either improperly directed at the Amendment
or based on mistaken readings of the Amendment or its record. Whereas
the preceding discussion implicitly responds to some complaints, the
94. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 225 (describing some limits on Vice President acting as
President).
95. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency, supra note 72, at 198.
96. Id. at 199-200.
97. CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 214 (1960).
98. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency, supra note 72, at 198-200.
99. Id. at 198-99. An Acting President in that situation would not be able to fill a vicepresidential vacancy since none would exist.
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remainder of this section answers some criticisms that have recently
appeared.
A.

Vice-Presidential Inability

To be sure, the inability provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment
left some gaps. They only apply when there is a functioning Vice
President. They accordingly cannot operate when the second office is
vacant or when the Vice President is disabled. 100 They do not provide a
means to declare a Vice President disabled, whether he is functioning in
his normal governmental capacity as Vice President, or additionally as
Acting President. This gap could create significant problems. 101 For this
reason, Vice President Dick Cheney, to his credit, prepared a letter of
resignation to be delivered to President George W. Bush if Cheney
became disabled. 102 Cheney had suffered four heart attacks before he
became Vice President, and another shortly after leaving office, and he
recognized that his incapacity due to a heart or other issue could
compromise America’s inability provisions. 103
Although these, and other gaps reflect deficiencies in America’s
system for handling presidential succession and inability, they cannot be
attributed to the Twenty-fifth Amendment, nor can its architects be
blamed for not addressing them. The framers of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment recognized these 104 and other deficiencies 105 in provisions for
handling presidential succession and inability but made a strategic
decision not to address them in that provision. They concluded that an
effort to solve all problems would substantially decrease the likelihood of

100. Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, supra note 85, at 71-72.
101. See generally Roy E. Brownell II, Vice-Presidential Inability: Historical Episodes That
Highlight a Significant Constitutional Problem, 46 PRESIDENTIAL. STUD. Q. 434 (2016) (presenting
comprehensive historical discussion and analysis of problem). See also Roy E. Brownell II, What to
do if Simultaneous Presidential and Vice Presidential Inability Struck Today, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
1027 (2017) (discussing ways to deal with problem under current legal regime).
102. DICK CHENEY WITH LIZ CHENEY, IN MY TIME 320-22 (2011).
103. Id. at 320 (discussing concern regarding consequences regarding presidential continuity of
vice-presidential inability).
104. See, e.g., Presidential Inability: Hearings on H.R. 836 et al Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 5(1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Rep. William
McCulloch) (recognizing that proposed Amendment did not address simultaneous presidential and
vice-presidential inability or presidential inability absent a Vice President); 111 CONG. REC. 3253
(1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh and Hruska) (recognizing Amendment’s failure to address vicepresidential disability).
105. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 104, at 5 (statement of Rep. William McCulloch)
(recognizing lack of provisions regarding deaths of successful presidential and vice-presidential
candidates between popular vote and inauguration).
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solving any problems. Amending the Constitution presented an arduous
and daunting task. The major challenges regarding presidential inability
had resisted solution for 180 years in large part due to a failure to reach
consensus regarding the proper remedies. The framers of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment found that broadening the scope of the Amendment made
success less likely. For instance, in the absence of a functioning Vice
President, the American Bar Association’s initial proposal called for the
person next-in-line after the Vice President to be able to discharge
presidential powers and duties or participate in a disability
determination. 106 Yet addressing that issue jeopardized the entire project.
Some senators, including Bayh, wanted to remove legislative leaders from
the line of succession and place the Secretary of State and other Cabinet
officials after the Vice President. Many in the House of Representatives
saw that proposal as an affront to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, both the institution and particularly its then occupant,
and strenuously opposed it. Any attempt to extend the disability
provisions beyond the Vice President necessarily engaged that intractable
issue. Rather than pursue an issue that threatened to kill any chance of
progress, Bayh and his colleagues decided to narrow their focus. Whereas
history indicated that the lack of a designated decision-maker and the
Tyler Precedent presented recurring presidential inability problems, those
relating to a disabled Vice President had not occurred and seemed more
remote. The framers prudently thought it better to address the most
important and likely problems rather than allow the pursuit of a perfect
fix to prevent any headway.
The challenges are greater if the Vice President is disabled than if the
office is vacant, although both situations offer some complexity. 107 If the
vice presidency is vacant, the person next-in-line, currently the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, would be a potential transferee of
presidential powers and duties. The Tyler Precedent would not be a
concern because the Constitution clearly provides that an “officer”
Congress designates to follow the Vice President only acts as President
and only until the disability ends. 108 But the absence of procedures
presents a gap in a situation where the President was unable or unwilling
106. See FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 32, at 57-58 (quoting ABA
consensus which includes “person next in line of succession” as potential transferee and decisionmaker).
107. Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, supra note 85, at 71-72.
108. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“. . .the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a President shall be elected.”).
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to declare his inability. Could the Speaker of the House, as the person next
in line, make the determination alone, or would she or he need the support
of a majority of the heads of the executive departments as under Section
4? Some believe the law designating the Speaker as next-in-line of
succession is unconstitutional, either on textual or structural grounds,
although the constitutional argument is subject to some powerful
counterarguments. 109 Yet the possibility of a change in partisan control of
presidential powers and duties does raise some troubling issues.
The larger problem arises if the vice presidency is occupied but its
occupant is disabled. It is more difficult to see the way forward in that
situation. The disabled Vice President could not be an effective transferee
of presidential powers and duties under Section 3 or 4. Yet there is no
mechanism in such a situation for the President to transfer powers and
duties voluntarily to the next in line since that person’s standing depends
on the inability of the Vice President yet law provides no clear means to
determine that incapacity. And it is not clear how the next-in-line could
determine that the President was disabled because there are no procedures
to declare the Vice President disabled, and accordingly, the Vice President
would retain the disability declaring powers Section 4 confers.
It is certainly unfortunate that these gaps remain 52 years later. But
that is not an indictment of the Twenty-fifth Amendment or those who
produced it. It and they accomplished a lot and as much as could be done
in one effort. It is unfortunate that Congress has not addressed these other
issues relating to vie-presidential inability during the last five decades. It
should.
B.

Alleged Ambiguities

Unlike these criticisms which address clear gaps, other negative
assessments of the disability provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment
target perceived ambiguities. They are no more persuasive.
1. Who are the “Principal Officers of the Executive Departments”
Some have criticized Section 4 as ambiguous regarding who acts
with the Vice President. 110 These criticisms are misguided. Historian
109. Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, supra note 85, at 83-94
(discussing constitutional and other objections to legislative succession).
110. See, e.g., Joshua Zeitz, Why the 25th Amendment Doesn’t Apply to Trump—No Matter What
He Tweets, POLITICO (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/10/25thamendment-trump-216267 [https://perma.cc/5R9Z-64K4] (claiming that Section 4 is “ambiguous”
regarding who are the ‘principal officers of the executive departments,’ and would prompt litigation);
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Joshua Zeitz has suggested that the phrase could include those given the
status of Cabinet members, although they do not head an executive
department. Yet the text of the Amendment rebuts this suggestion. It does
not empower the Cabinet, but only those Cabinet members who are
“principal officers of the executive departments” which, for instance, the
chief of staff and other non-department heads, who sometimes are given
Cabinet status, clearly are not. Indeed, the framers of Section 4 spent
considerable time discussing this issue 111 and specifically rebutted the
suggestion that such figures were included. 112 They repeatedly made clear
that the phrase refers to the presidential appointees who direct the
executive departments identified in 5 U.S.C. 1 or any such departments
established in the future. 113 The Office of Legal Counsel for the
Department of Justice, which often renders constitutional interpretations
the executive branch views as authoritative, has shared this conclusion for
34 years. 114 The Supreme Court reached that conclusion in dicta in
1991. 115 It is less certain whether an undersecretary or acting head could
participate, but that is an issue that arises at the margins. It is hard to
imagine how, realistically speaking, the identity of the basic decisionmakers could have been made much clearer.

David Pozen, The Deceptively Clear Twenty-fifth Amendment, CONST. CTR. (Jul. 11, 2018),
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-xxv/the-deceptivelyclear-twenty-fifth-amendment-by-david-pozen/interp/42 [https://perma.cc/V9QY-ZJEC] (stating that
phrases “principal officers” and “executive departments” are ambiguous).
111. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 32, at 117 (stating that few
subjects received such extensive treatment in the legislative record as the identification of the Section
4 decision-makers who acted with the Vice President).
112. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 118-21 (describing the legislative history on this subject).
113. H.R. REP. 89-203, at 3 (1965) (stating that term was limited to “Presidential appointees
who direct the 10 executive departments named in 5 U.S.C. 1, or any executive department established
in the future, generally considered to comprise the President’s Cabinet”); 111 CONG. REC. 3283
(statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (confirming that “heads of the executive departments” referred to
those identified in 5 U.S.C. 1 and 2); id. at 7941 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (identifying
Section 4 decision-makers as Vice President and Cabinet members who headed executive departments
and were identified in specific statute); id. at 7944 (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) (same); id. at
7944-45 (statements of Rep. Celler and Rep. Basil L. Whitener) (same); id. at 7946 (statements of
Rep. Celler and Rep. Edward Hutchinson) (same); id. at 7945 (statement of Rep. William McCulloch)
(agreeing with Rep. Celler’s definition).
114. Operation of the Twenty-fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession, 9 Op.
O.L.C. 65, 69 (1985).
115. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 887 (1991) (stating that the department heads listed in
5 U.S.C. 101 are the “principal officers of the executive departments” referred to in Section 4).
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2. Section 4 and the Unwilling But Conscious Disabled President
Some have argued that Section 4 of the Amendment is limited to
situations where the President is unable to declare his own inability. 116
Consistent with this narrow reading, some recent writers would confine
Section 4 to situations like President Kennedy’s condition between his
shooting and death, 117 or when a President was “unable to communicate,
or curled up in a fugue state,” 118 or to Presidents who were “terminally ill,
in a coma, near death, or severely mentally incapacitated.”119 These
situations clearly constitute situations in which a President is “unable to
discharge the powers and duties” of the office, yet they rest on a mistaken
premise that excludes situations where a disabled President is able but
unwilling to recognize his incapacity. They do not provide an exhaustive
list.
To begin with, such dramatic limitations are inconsistent with the
text of Section 3 and 4. Section 4 is not limited to situations in which the
President cannot communicate that he is unable. Rather, its text adopts the
far broader formulation that presidential powers and duties are transferred
“Whenever” the designated decision-makers transmit the prescribed
written declaration that “the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office.” Three points are worth noting. First, the test is
the President’s inability to discharge presidential powers and duties, not
his inability to make or communicate or even to do so rationally. Second,
the determination of presidential inability is committed to decisionmakers, initially designated by the Constitution but potentially determined
in part by Congress. Accordingly, the power to determine when the
President is “unable” is committed to the designated decision-makers.
116. See, e.g., Adam R.F. Gustafson, Note, Presidential Inability and Subjective Meaning, 27
YALE L.& POL’Y REV. 459, 462 (2009) (arguing that Section 4 only applies when President “is so
severely impaired that he is unable to make or communicate a rational decision to step down
temporarily of his own accord”); Scott Bomboy, Can the Cabinet “Remove” a President Using the
Amendment?
CONST.
CTR.
CONST.
DAILY
(Oct.
12,
2017),
25th
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/can-the-cabinet-remove-a-president-using-the-25th-amendment
[https://perma.cc/LB27-EEGZ] (stating that Section 4 was “designed to deal with a situation where
an incapacitated President couldn’t tell Congress that the Vice President needed to act as President”).
117. Jonathan Zimmerman, What Liberals Can Learn from Conservatism, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec.
11,
2017),
https://newrepublic.com/article/146192/liberals-can-learn-conservatism
[https://perma.cc/8PY4-WZRE].
118. Jeff Greenfield, A Liberal Fantasy Ripped from a Hollywood Script, POLITICO (Mar. 29,
2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/25th-amendment-trump-cabinet-removeoffice-president-fantasy-214965 [https://perma.cc/ZC94-VKQT].
119. Jeffrey Rosen, The 25th Amendment Makes Presidential Disability a Political Question,
ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/presidentialdisability-is-a-political-question/527703/ [https://perma.cc/89JA-82ES].
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That is not to say that they are free agents, but they must interpret the
standards in accordance with the text, legislative and other relevant
history, structural arguments, and facts. Finally, the transfer occurs
“Whenever” the decision-makers determine the President is “unable,” not
simply on extreme cases when he or she cannot so communicate.
The context surrounding the adoption of Sections 3 and 4 reveal their
breadth. They responded not simply to the Kennedy assassination scenario
but to Eisenhower’s three disabilities and to the earlier Garfield and
Wilson disabilities. The Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower disabilities
involved few moments where the President was unconscious or near death
yet were frequently referenced as situations in which presidential
inabilities existed and in which power should have been transferred.
The legislative history reinforces the text’s breadth. The legislative
record is replete with references that confirm that Section 4 was to apply
when a disabled President was unwilling to declare his incapacity, as well
as when he was unable to do so. 120 To be sure, in one colloquy Bayh gave
a narrower definition of “unable” to refer to “an impairment of the
President’s faculties” which made him “unable either to make or
communicate his decisions as to his own competency to execute the
powers and duties of his office.” 121 Yet later in the same day’s discussion,
Bayh stated a broader formulation, 122 and when the Senate debated the
Conference Report which contained the final version of the Amendment,
he made clear that inability addressed the “physical or mental inability to
exercise the powers and duties” of the presidency, not simply the inability
to make or communicate such a decision. 123 Similarly, the leaders of the
effort in the House made clear that Section 4 referred to situations where
the President was unwilling, as well as those where he was unable to
declare an inability. 124 As states considered ratification, proponents of the
Amendment widely circulated articles Feerick wrote after Congress
proposed the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which stated that Section 4
applied when the President was unwilling or unable to declare his own
120. See generally Goldstein, supra note 1, at 106-11 (describing legislative history showing
broader understanding of scope of Section 4).
121. 111 CONG. REC. 3282 (1965).
122. Id. at 3282-83.
123. 111 CONG. REC. 15, 381 (1965) (statements by Sen. Robert F. Kennedy and Sen. Bayh).
124. 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler) (Section 4 addressed
situations where the President was “unwilling or unable to declare his inability”); id. at 7942
(statement of Rep. William McCulloch) (stating that Section 4 applied when the President “should
fail to” declare an inability or was “too ill to do so”); id. at 7941 (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff)
(stating that Section 4 applies when the President “by reason of physical or mental debility, is unable
to perform his duties but is unable or unwilling to make a rational decision to relinquish the powers
of his office”)
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inability. 125 Framers, like Bayh and Feerick, have stated in subsequent
writings that Section 4 applies when a President refuses to recognize an
inability, as well as when he is unable to do so. 126
A review of Section 4 in its entirety confirms these conclusions from
the text and legislative record. 127 Section 4 allows the Vice President and
majority of the principal officers of the executive departments to
challenge a President’s declaration that “no inability exists,” even though
such a President must obviously be conscious enough to sign and dispatch
such a statement. The Amendment recognizes that although such a
President is obviously not in a coma, a fugue state, unconscious, or in
anything approaching the condition JFK was in between the shooting and
his death, his ability to exercise presidential powers and duties still might
be compromised and subject to challenge. The Amendment provides that
such a President can be prohibited from resuming the powers and duties
of the office for close to a month unless the Vice President, 50% of the
Cabinet, or a house of Congress agree with his position. Can one really
make a straight-faced argument that the same Amendment, which would
impose so many hurdles to a conscious President resuming power for so
long, would prevent the President’s associates from declaring such a
President disabled in the first place?
3. Can the President Immediately Resume Presidential Powers
Finally, some argue that the Section 4 procedures are ambiguous in
arguably allowing a President to resume presidential powers and duties
immediately upon his “no inability” declaration without waiting for the
125. See John D. Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 34
FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 199-200 (1965) (stating that Section 4 applies when “the President cannot or
refuses to declare his own inability”); John D. Feerick, Proposed Amendment on Presidential Inability
and Vice-Presidential Vacancy, 51 A.B.A. J. 915, 916 (1965) (stating that Section 4 applies when “the
President is unable to declare his own inability or . . .refuses to do so when disabled.”); American Bar
Association and John D. Feerick, Presidential inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy: With
Questions and Answers (1965) (stating that Section 4 applies when the President “is
unable. . .or. . .refuses to declare his inability”).
126. See, e.g., Birch Bayh, Reflections on the Twenty-fifth Amendment as We Enter a New
Century, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 55,
58 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000) (stating that Section 4 applies when the President “is unable or
unwilling” to declare his own disability); Birch Bayh, The Twenty-fifth Amendment: Dealing with
Presidential Disability, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 437, 441 (1995)(stating that Section 4 applies
“when the President is unable or unwilling to act”); FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT,
supra note 32, at 115 (stating that Section 4 applies when the President “cannot or does not” declare
his own inability); John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the
Twenty-fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 925 (2010) (stating that Section 4 applies when
the President “cannot or refuses” to declare his disability).
127. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 111-12.
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passage of the four days the Amendment gives the Vice President and
Cabinet to respond. 128 In fact, the text, legislative history, and structure of
Section 4 make clear that notwithstanding the President’s declaration of
his fitness, the Vice President continues to exercise presidential powers
and duties during the four day period unless the Vice President and/or a
majority of the Cabinet acquiesce in the President’s determination.
It is, of course, true that some scholars have either misunderstood the
provision or concluded that it was unclear. It is also true that the clause
might have been formulated more clearly. A proposal by Poff, for
instance, provided that following the President’s “no inability”
declaration, he would “resume” presidential powers and duties “on the
second day of making such announcement, or at such earlier time” as the
President and Vice President agreed, unless the Vice President and a
majority of the Cabinet challenged the President’s “no inability”
declaration, in which case the Vice President would continue acting as
President pending Congressional action within ten days. 129
Yet a clause does not become ambiguous simply because some have
misconstrued it or because it might have been better stated. Section 4
would only be ambiguous if a review of it in its entirety and surrounding
evidence allowed an alternative reasonable interpretation regarding who
exercises presidential power during the four day period. A reading of
Section 4 in its entirety, the legislative record, and consideration of
structural considerations makes clear that there is only one possible
reasonable conclusion.
The text of Section 4 provides that if the President transmits a “no
inability” declaration, he “shall resume the powers and duties” of the
presidency “unless the Vice President” and a Cabinet majority transmit a
contesting statement “within four days.” The better reading of this textual
fragment understands that the President’s resumption does not occur
immediately but is contingent upon the nonoccurrence of the condition,
i.e. the contesting letter from the Vice President and a majority of the

128. See, e.g., David Faris, Could the 25th Amendment Really Remove Trump from Office?, THE
WEEK (Aug. 17, 2017), https://theweek.com/articles/718950/could-25th-amendment-really-removetrump-from-office [https://perma.cc/67UF-V6AT]; Julia L. Ernst, John F. Kennedy and
Constitutional Aspects of Presidential Succession, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 82 n.116 (2014) (arguing
that Section 4 is sufficiently ambiguous to support a “plausible” argument that President resumes
power following his “no inability” assertion). See also BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL
CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES 64, 82 (2012) (concluding
that better legal arguments leave Vice President in power but including problem as a “constitutional
cliffhanger”).
129. H.R.J. Res. 3 (1965).
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principal officers. 130 That reading becomes inevitable, as a textual matter,
when other textual clues are considered. To begin with, the text does not
provide that the President resumes power “immediately” as the proposed
alternative concludes. The omission is significant because Section 4 uses
that precise adverb in the preceding sentence when the Vice President
initially takes power. If Section 4 intended the President resume power
“immediately,” it would have used that word.
Moreover, for the President to resume and then be divested of power,
the clause would need to provide that he “shall resume unless and until”
the Vice President and Cabinet majority dispatch the contesting letter. Yet
the text does not include “until” in Section 4, an omission that becomes
more significant because the Amendment includes that very word in
Section 3 to end the Vice President’s discharge of presidential powers.
Indeed, “until” was added in Section 3 to make clear that a President who
voluntarily transferred power under that provision would not be subject to
the challenge process applicable to Section 4. Instead, he would return
immediately upon his “no inability” declaration. If Section 4 intended the
President to resume power and then be divested if and when the Vice
President and Cabinet majority challenged his “no inability” declaration,
it would have said that the President “immediately resumes” presidential
powers and duties “unless and until” the Vice President et al transmit the
contesting letter. It did not.
Finally, the text makes it clear that if the Vice President and Cabinet
majority challenge the President’s “no inability” declaration the Vice
President remains in power while Congress considers the challenge. Yet
the language of Section 4 nowhere provides that the Vice President returns
to power once she and the majority of the principal officers issue their
letter challenging the President’s “no inability” declaration. If the
President resumes power upon his declaration, how does the Vice
President return so she can be acting President while the houses of
Congress deliberate? Section 4 in its entirety is consistent with the
conclusion that the Vice President remains in power during the four-day
period and is inconsistent with the contrary interpretation that the
President resumes power until the challenging declaration because it
nowhere provides for the Vice President to return after being divested. 131
The textual argument when read in context is simply overpowering.
As strong as it is, the legislative history is even more one-sided. 132 It

130.
131.
132.

Goldstein, supra note 1, at 128-30.
Goldstein, supra note 1, at 128-31.
Id. at 130-44.
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supports the conclusion that the Vice President continues to exercise
powers during the four day period. During Congressional hearings and
debates, important framers of the Amendment including Bayh, Celler,
Brownell, Katzenbach, Professor Paul A. Freund, and Feerick all stated
that the Vice President remained in power during the period the Vice
President and Cabinet were given to decide on their response to the
President’s “no inability” declaration. 133 So did other congressmen who
expressed a position on the subject. 134 The Committee Reports echoed that
interpretation. 135 The House of Representatives even considered, and
rejected, an amendment that would have allowed the President to act
during the period, a proposal that would not have been offered if anyone
thought Section 4 as written did that. 136 No one in congressional debates
or hearings expressed the interpretation that the language in Section 4
allowed the President to resume power and then be divested. Feerick’s
articles which were circulated during the ratification period expressed the
same interpretation, that the Vice President continued to discharge
presidential powers and duties. 137
It requires no imagination to appreciate the considerations behind
this universal interpretation, especially because the legislative record
repeated them on multiple occasions. An interpretation that left the Vice
President in power, pending the response to the President’s assertion, gave
greater certainty that the person discharging presidential powers and
duties was able to discharge those powers and duties and minimized the
number of transfers and accordingly contributed to stability. 138 Moreover,
an interpretation that would allow the President to resume immediately,
pending a decision regarding his fitness, would undermine the operation
of the entire procedure by allowing the President to remove Cabinet
officials who questioned his capacity, thereby preventing the procedure
from functioning. 139 It is, of course, a basic principle of constitutional
interpretation that the Constitution should be interpreted in a manner to
allow the “beneficial execution” of its provisions absent a clear textual

133. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 132-40, 141-44.
134. Id. at 139-41.
135. S. Rep. No. 88-1382, at 12 (1964); S. Rep. No. 89-66, at 3, 14 (1965); H.R. Rep. No. 89203, at 2-3 (1965). See generally Goldstein, supra note 1, at 132-33, 135-36, 138-39.
136. 111 CONG. REC. 7966 (1965).
137. Feerick, Proposed Amendment, supra note 125, at 917; Feerick, Proposed Twenty-fifth
Amendment, supra note 125, at, 200-01; American Bar Association & Feerick, supra note 125, at 4
(stating that President only resumes power if his declaration is not contested by Vice President and
Cabinet majority within four days).
138. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 143-44.
139. Id. at 144.
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command to the contrary. 140 Chief Justice John Marshall expressed that
precept in McCulloch v. Maryland, and it remains if anything more
compelling two centuries later in this, its bicentennial year. 141
VI. CONCLUSION
The presidential inability provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment
represented an important contribution to ensuring presidential inability.
They addressed constitutional gaps which history exposed and which put
the nation at risk, especially as the world became smaller and the absence
of effective executive leadership more threatening. The Amendment
required a major legislative effort in which the challenges of constitutional
amendment limited the issues that could be addressed. It dealt with the
major issues regarding presidential inability and succession and it did so
in a thoughtful, constructive, and clear way. It is odd that some complain
that the Amendment did not define its terms. The Constitution doesn’t. To
do so would run counter to its nature as an outline to endure for centuries,
rather than as a highly prescriptive code. Yet the Amendment and its
legislative history provided ample direction on significant issues for those
willing to engage them.
The presidential inability provisions, of course, are not selfexecuting. They provide procedures for government officials to
implement. They depend on conscientious performance by governors, and
on engaged citizenship by the governed.
Yet they offer a set of procedures that rescue the United States from
some of the gaps of the original Constitution and some of the problems
history introduced. They enable America to better ensure that it will have
functioning executive leadership. That is something to celebrate in the
Amendment’s Golden Jubilee.

140.
141.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819)
Id. at 408-09.

